Heidegger’s Ontology – a critical review
Peter Atkinson 08/06/2025
Martin Heidegger’s ontology remains one of the most challenging and consequential contributions to 20th-century philosophy, provoking both rigorous scholarly engagement and heated controversy. His interrogation of Being (Sein) sought to dismantle the metaphysical tradition that, in his view, had obscured the fundamental question of existence since Plato. This critical review examines Heidegger’s ontology with particular attention to its philosophical innovations, its reception among later thinkers, and the ethical dilemmas it continues to pose for contemporary scholarship.
Heidegger’s project in Being and Time (1927) marks a decisive break from Husserlian phenomenology, which had focused on the structures of consciousness. While Husserl sought to bracket existential assumptions to examine phenomena as they appear to consciousness (the epoché), Heidegger argued that this method neglected the more primordial question of what it means to be in the first place (Heidegger, 1962). His famous example of the hammer illustrates this shift: when a hammer is used skilfully, it withdraws from explicit awareness, revealing itself not as a discrete “object” but as part of a meaningful network of practical engagement (Zuhandenheit, or “ready-to-hand”). Only when the hammer breaks, does it become an object of theoretical scrutiny (Vorhandenheit, or “present-at-hand”). This distinction underscores Heidegger’s broader claim that traditional metaphysics, by privileging abstract presence, has overlooked the dynamic, contextual nature of Being.
Central to Heidegger’s ontology is the concept of Dasein (“being-there”), his term for the human mode of existence. Unlike Cartesian subjectivity, which posits a detached “thinking thing,” Dasein is always already embedded in a world, constituted by its concerns, projects, and temporal horizons (Heidegger, 1962). For instance, the act of reading is not merely a cognitive operation but an existential engagement shaped by one’s historical situation, intentions, and anticipations. Heidegger’s analysis of temporality further radicalizes this view: Dasein’s being is fundamentally future orientated, as it projects itself toward possibilities while being “thrown” into a past it did not choose. His notion of “being-toward-death” (Sein-zum-Tode) encapsulates this temporal structure, arguing that an authentic confrontation with mortality disrupts complacency and reveals the finite stakes of existence (Blattner, 2006).
The so-called “turn” (Kehre) in Heidegger’s later work shifts from the existential analytic of Dasein to a more poetic meditation on Being as such. In Contributions to Philosophy (1936–1938), he abandons the language of subjectivity altogether, framing Being as an event (Ereignis) that grants meaning to beings while withdrawing itself (Polt, 2006). This later phase, exemplified by essays like The Question Concerning Technology (1954), critiques modernity’s reduction of all existence to calculable resources (Bestand), arguing that technology’s “enframing” (Gestell) obscures alternative ways of revealing truth (Heidegger, 1977). His reading of Hölderlin’s poetry, for instance, suggests that art can disrupt instrumental thinking by disclosing Being’s enigmatic presence.
Critics have contested Heidegger’s ontology on multiple fronts. Levinas (1969) accused him of prioritizing Being over ethics, arguing that the face of the Other demands a responsibility irreducible to ontological categories. Derrida (1982), while indebted to Heidegger, deconstructed the residual metaphysics in his binaries (e.g., authenticity/inauthenticity), showing how they rely on unexamined hierarchies. Feminist theorists like Irigaray (1999) have highlighted the gendered omissions in his account of Dasein, noting how embodiment and intersubjectivity are sidelined. Most damningly, Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism—particularly his 1933 Rectoral Address, which aligned his philosophy with National Socialist rhetoric—has led scholars like Habermas (1989) to question whether his ontology harbours an authoritarian subtext.
Contemporary applications of Heidegger’s thought reveal its enduring relevance. In cognitive science, enactivist theories draw on his critique of representationalism to argue that cognition emerges from embodied action (Varela et al., 1991). Environmental philosophers employ his critique of technology to challenge anthropocentric frameworks (Zimmerman, 1994). Yet these appropriations cannot evade the ethical quandaries his legacy imposes. As Adorno (1964) warned, any uncritical rehabilitation risks normalising the “jargon of authenticity” that once served ideological ends. We must, therefore, engage Heidegger’s profound insights into Being while rigorously interrogating their political and ethical limits.
References
Adorno, T. (1964). The Jargon of Authenticity. Northwestern University Press.
Blattner, W. (2006). Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism. Cambridge University Press.
Derrida, J. (1982). Margins of Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
Habermas, J. (1989). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. MIT Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question Concerning Technology. Harper & Row.
Irigaray, L. (1999). The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger. University of Texas Press.
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and Infinity. Duquesne University Press.
Polt, R. (2006). The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”. Cornell University Press.
Varela, F., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind. MIT Press.
Zimmerman, M. (1994). Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity. University of California Press.
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